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Previewschildren. The NF1 gene encodes neuro-
fibromin, a RAS GTPase that converts
the GTP-bound active form of RAS pro-
teins to the inactive, guanosine diphos-
phate (GDP)-bound form (Scheffzek
et al., 1997). As indicated in Figure 1,
loss-of-function NF1 leads to hyperacti-
vation of the RAF/MEK/ERK pathway
and is associated with neurological
diseases—notably low-grade astrocy-
tomas. Studies by Gutmann and his
colleagues demonstrate that NF1 inacti-
vation promotes astroglial differentiation
(Dasgupta and Gutmann, 2005). More-
over, deleting floxedNf1 in neural progen-
itors during early embryonic stages leads
to a dramatic increase in the glia cell
population in the brain (Hegedus et al.,
2007)—a phenotype quite similar to that
of the caMek1/hGFAP mice described
by Li et al. (2012). Another very recent
study by Zhu and his colleagues reveals
that deletion of Nf1 in neural stem cells
results in increased gliogenesis at the
expense of neurogenesis. Importantly,
the NF1-mediated glia/neuronal fate
switch is due to overactivation of MEK/
ERK signaling, as it can be reversed by
applying small molecule inhibitors of
MEK/ERK function (Wang et al., 2012).
The low-grade astrocytomas seen in
NF1 patients have a sporadic counterpart
in children. Recent studies show that942 Neuron 75, September 20, 2012 ª2012 Ea large majority of pediatric low-grade
astrocytomas have activating mutations
in BRAF (see Figure 1) (Jones et al.,
2008; Pfister et al., 2008).
Closer to home for the basic scientists,
the observations of Li et al. (2012) present
a useful new tool to the field of glial
biology. Postnatal functions of astrocytes
have been difficult to resolve because
it has been difficult to manipulate astro-
cyte number during development. Li
et al. (2012) note that the NestinCre
Mek null mice are acallosal at P0 in
tandem with the absence of midline
astroglia. Moreover, the hGFAPCre Mek
null animals show a neurodegenerative
phenotype by day P10. For the road
ahead, the Mek ablation and Mek hyper-
activation models described here may
provide a means of changing neuron/glia
ratios to display glial functions in neuronal
activity. In the fullness of time, such
manipulations might even shed light on
the role of glia in the cognitive aspects
of NF1 syndrome and a variety of other
hereditary ‘‘RASothapies’’ associated
with mutations in core components of
the signaling axis.REFERENCES
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In this issue of Neuron, Nicolle et al. (2012) suggest that choice-related value signals in ventromedial and
anterior dorsomedial prefrontal cortex can be distinguished by their relevance to the current choice, as
opposed to their reflection of preferences ascribed to the self versus another.Our understanding of the neural mecha-
nisms of value-based decision making
has increased dramatically in the last
decade. Much of this progress has beenachieved with the adoption of formal
mathematical models that can be used
to explain the process by which we
compute values for stimuli in the worldand use those values to guide our choices
(Montague et al., 1996; Glimcher andRus-
tichini, 2004; Daw et al., 2005). By map-
ping components of these mathematical
Neuron
Previewsmodels to neural activity (a technique
called computational fMRI; O’Doherty
et al., 2007), it has been possible not only
to determine whether a region is engaged
under a condition of interest, but also to
make inferences about the nature of the
computations being implemented. More
recently, efforts have been made to
expand the application of this method to
choice problems with a social component
(Hampton et al., 2008; Suzuki et al., 2012)
These studies have reaffirmed the roles of
key areas of prefrontal cortex such as
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC),
known previously to be engaged in tasks
requiring social cognition (Amodio and
Frith, 2006), and ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC), known to be involved
in value-based choice (Hare et al., 2008).
But, more importantly, such studies are
beginning to yield insights into the specific
components of the choice processes
in which these areas are implicated. In a
new study published in the current issue
of Neuron, Nicolle et al. (2012) used com-
putational fMRI to investigate whether the
neural substrates of value are sensitive to
the distinction between actions evaluated
based on their direct value to the self and
those evaluated based on their value to
others.
In the task design in Nicolle et al. (2012),
subjects made a choice on each trial
between receiving a small monetary prize
that would be delivered following a short
delay or a larger prize that would be
received following a longer delay, with
themagnitudes and delays varying across
trials. Crucially, trials differed in that on
some, the subject chose between the
prizes based on their own preferences,
while on others they made choices on
behalf of a partner, whose preferences
they had learned in a training session
before beginning the task. Subjects were
paired with partners whose preferences
for the balance between prize magnitude
and delay were dissimilar to their own,
which enabled the authors to determine
that subjects were truly making choices
for their partner based on the partner’s
preferences. The authors used the
choices made by each of the subjects
during the task to fit a temporal discount-
ing model, which allowed them to esti-
mate for each trial both the valuations
subjects held for the prizes (‘‘self values’’)
and the valuations for the prizes thesubject ascribed to their partner (‘‘partner
values’’). The sets of choices presented to
the subjects were constructed such that
the correlation between the self and
partner values of the available prizes
were minimized, allowing the authors to
separately examine the neural correlates
of each. The time series of the self and
partner values were regressed against
fMRI data that were acquired while the
subjects made their choices in order to
test for regions with corresponding
response profiles.
Accumulating evidence suggests that
the vmPFC plays a key role in ‘‘model-
based’’ reinforcement learning, in which
the value of decision options is computed
with reference to a rich internal model of
the states of the decision problem and
the reward values of these states (or
‘‘state space’’) (Hampton et al., 2006;
Daw et al., 2011). Accordingly, the value
of options can be updated instanta-
neously in a model-based framework
based on knowledge about changes in
the structure of the world, such as, for
example, a change in the subjective value
of the goal state (Valentin et al., 2007),
or a change in the transitions between
states reached following specific actions
(Hampton et al., 2006). Here, Nicolle
et al. (2012) found that, when participants
were asked to choose for themselves,
activity in vmPFC reflected valuation
signals corresponding to the relative
values assigned to the options based on
their own subjective preferences, consis-
tent with the findings of a number of
previous studies (Boorman et al., 2009;
FitzGerald et al., 2009). However, much
more intriguing was the finding that, in
trials in which the subjects made choices
on behalf of their partners, vmPFC no
longer responded to the self values, but
instead responded to the partner values;
that is, activity in vmPFC reflected not
their own preferences, but rather those
of their partner. Within the context of a
role for this region inmodel-basedcompu-
tations, the findings byNicolle et al. starkly
demonstrate just how flexible the value
computations in this region are: not only
does vmPFC reflect valuation based on
one’s own preferences when those are
needed to guide choice, but the same
region can also reflect the preferences of
another person when those preferences
are relevant to the choice process.Neuron 75, SeIn addition to the valuation signals
noted in vmPFC, Nicolle et al. also report
a striking pattern of value-related BOLD
activation in dmPFC. Specifically, on trials
in which the subjects made choices on
behalf of their partners, dmPFC re-
sponded to the difference in the self value
for the two available prizes, while in trials
in which subjects chose for themselves,
dmPFC responded to the difference in
their partner values. It is interesting to
note that the self- versus other-oriented
distinction was not reflected in the
neural activations in either dmPFC or
vmPFC. That is, although one value
signal reflected the subjects’ own prefer-
ences for discounting and the other, argu-
ably more social, value signal reflected
the preferences subjects attributed to
their partners, each was encoded in
vmPFC when relevant for choice and in
dmPFC when it was not. The pattern
of dmPFC activations is particularly
surprising in this regard, given the role
commonly attributed to the region in sup-
porting social cognition (Amodio and
Frith, 2006). In particular, the ability to
‘‘mentalize,’’ or to attribute intentions,
beliefs, and other mental states to other
agents is consistently associated with
activation of this region across fMRI and
PET studies (Frith and Frith, 2003).
However, the present results suggest
that anterior dmPFC in the present task
may not necessarily be ‘‘social’’ at all,
but instead might facilitate the simulation
of signals that are currently not relevant
for choice, regardless of whether those
signals correspond to representations
about the self or another person. Such
an interpretation conforms to theories of
dmPFC function that claim that its critical
role lies in the creation of representations
of the world that are decoupled from the
sensory environment (Frith and Frith,
2003). Such a computational process
could still underlie social inferences
by allowing for the simulation of other
agents, but importantly, its functional
remit is not limited to social contexts,
but rather to any situation in which simula-
tion of events divorced from the sensory
environment is required.
The above-mentioned interpretation of
the dmPFC findings raises an interesting
question: Why are these value signals in
dmPFCbeing computed in the first place?
The presence of these activations isptember 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 943
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Previewssomewhat surprising in the task used by
Nicolle et al., because the respective vari-
ables they represent are, at least superfi-
cially, irrelevant to the choice at hand.
One possibility is that the representation
of the valuations according to the alterna-
tive preference set in dmPFC corre-
sponds to their storage in a temporary
buffer. In the event of a change of decision
context, those signals can be immediately
transferred into vmPFC, permitting rapid
deployment of the now behaviorally rele-
vant preference set. Another possibility
is that (although not applicable in the
specific task used by Nicolle et al.,
2012), the representation of the alterna-
tive valuations in dmPFC may allow for
the ongoing updating of those model-
based value signals on the basis of new
information about the sensory environ-
ment as it is received.
The study byNicolle et al. invites several
important directions for further research
going forward. First of all, if ‘‘other’’ versus
‘‘self’’ is not the relevant dimension for
differentiating ventromedial versus ante-
rior dorsomedial prefrontal function, but
instead the distinction is between the
choice relevance of alternative state-
space models, one might expect a similar944 Neuron 75, September 20, 2012 ª2012 Epatternof results in a task involving switch-
ing between two state-space models,
even in a completely nonsocial context.
Second, if it is the case that the dmPFC
is acting as a buffer to store alternative
models of the decision problem at hand
to enable rapid transferring of choice-rele-
vant models into vmPFC, what happens
in the dmPFC if more than two such
frameworks are to be used for a given
task, such as, for example, if participants
had to make choices on behalf of two
other people as well as themselves?
Regardless of the outcome of such future
research, the study by Nicolle et al.
illustrates how, through the use of quanti-
tative computational approaches married
to dynamic measurements of brain func-
tion, it is possible to gain insight into the
specific computational functions of brain
regions involved in even themost complex
social-cognitive processes.REFERENCES
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In this issue ofNeuron, Guerin et al. (2012) provide novel evidence that distinct parietal mechanisms for atten-
tion and memory compete when past experiences are compared to current perceptual input. While dorsal
parietal cortex supports attention to perceptual stimuli, high attentional demands suppress ventral parietal
regions important for veridical remembering.When walking down a street, sitting in
a restaurant, or boarding a plane, we
often find our attention captured by a
person that looks like someone we
know. We find ourselves wondering: do
I know this person? In these situations,we focus on perceptual features of this
candidate acquaintance and compare
these perceived features to our internal
representation (memory) of the neighbor,
colleague, or relation that they resemble.
Through this process we may determinethat this person is not a person we know
(in which case we would likely opt to not
wave or say hello) or that this person is
someone we know (in which case we
may still find ourselves debating whether
the situation permits a wave or hello).
